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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In "Tax Incentives for Higher Education," Caroline Hoxby investigates
the economic effects of provisions related to higher education in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. This timely paper summarizes the major
initiatives: Hope Tax Credits, Tax Credits for Lifelong Learning, Educa-
tion IRAs, and tax deductibility of interest on student loans. The paper
describes the incentives that these provisions generate for attending
college and discusses the question of whether the people who most need
to attend college are the ones most likely to be induced to attend by the
new initiatives. It then synthesizes the existing literature on how federal
government funds for higher education affect the tuition charged by
colleges and universities, and it assesses the likely consequences of the
new provisions for tuition. Finally, the paper discusses the probable
effects of the initiatives on family saving and on the degree of effort and
planning that students put into college.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Clinton Administration claimed that the 1998 budget represents the
"biggest investment in higher education since the G.I. Bifi 50 years ago."
This statement is something of an exaggeration in that it is true in nomi-
nal dollars, but not in real dollars. Nevertheless, both Congress and the
Administration were eager to "do something" for higher education this
The author is Morris Kahn Associate Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and
Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research.50 Hoxby
year, and they made it a centerpiece of thebudget debate. The result
was more than 40 billion dollars in tax expendituresrelated to higher
education in the budgets for fiscal years 1998 through 2002.
In this paper, I analyze the tax initiatives related to highereducation in
the 1998 budget. I attempt to assess each of the major programsboth as
economic policy and as education policy. In the long run, the two criteria
tend to boil down to a single one, since a policy that causes people to
make more optimal investments in education is good for economic
growth.
It is important to stress that higher-education initiatives should be ana-
lyzed with the goal of determining whether they induce people to invest
in the amount of education that is optimal for them.1 All too often,analy-
sis focuses purely on the narrow question of whether an initiativewifi
increase enrollment in higher education. While enrollment estimates are
primarily what is needed for federal budget projections, enrolling in col-
lege does not necessarily correspond to successful investment in college
education. Among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperationand
Development) countries, the U.S. has the lowest rate of college comple-
tion conditional upon college enrollment. Moreover, the U.S. rateof col-
lege completion conditional upon enrollment has been falling steadily
since the late 1960s, suggesting that there may even be a causallink
between subsidies to higher education and the percentage of enrolled
students who are prepared and able to complete a degree. For these
reasons, it is best to treat enrollment as only onechoice in the larger
decision to invest in higher education and to analyze the effects of a higher
education initiative on that larger decision, which includes issues related
to students' choice of college, student effort and preparation, savingfor
college, student persistence, and the use of college as a signal of ability.
2. HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1998 BUDGET
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the items related to education in the
1998 budget. The two most costly items related to education are the tax
credits called the Hope Credit and the Tax Credit for Lifelong Learning.
Combined, these are expected to cost $31 bfflion in fiscal years 1998
through 2002. The Hope Credit wifi subsidize an individual's first two
years of undergraduate education by givinghim a tax credit worth 100
percent of the first $1,000 plus 50 percent of the second $1,000 he spends
1Ideally, the standard should be whether an education investment is socially optimal.
However, achieving privately optimal education investments would be the bulk of a pro-
cess that achieved social optimality.Tax Incentives for Higher Education51
TABLE 1
Provisions Related to Higher Education in the 1998-2002 Budgets
Pell grants:
Tuition, fee, and living assistance for poor students enrolled
in higher education; the maximum Pell grant raised from
$2,700 to $3,000.
Hope scholarship:
A $1,500-a-year non-refundable tax credit for the first two
years of college; credit is 100% of the first $1,000 that a stu-
dent spends on tuition and fees, and 50% of the second
$1,000; phases out for individuals earning $40,000 to
$50,000 and couples earning $80,000 to $100,000 a year.
Tax credit for lifelong learning:
A non-refundable tax credit for undergraduate and gradu-
ate study; credit is worth 20% of up to $5,000 a year spent
on tuition and fees through 2002, and 20% of up to $10,000
a year thereafter; same phaseout as Hope Scholarship.
Penalty-free IRA withdrawals for college expenses and tax-
sheltered college savings accounts:
In addition to penalty-free withdrawals from IRA accounts
that are not counted as gross income so long as they pay for
college expenses, families may contribute up to $500 a year
for each child into a savings account that has the same tax
shelter as an IRA account and whose distributions are not
counted as gross income if the proceeds are used to pay for
college expenses; phases out for families earning $150,000
to $160,000 a year.
Deduction of student-loan interest:
Whether they itemize or not, borrowers may deduct from
their taxable income the interest paid on student loans; de-
duction starts at $1,000 a year in 1998 and rises in $500 incre-
ments to $2,500 by 2001; phases out for families earning
$60,000 to $75,000 a year.
Minor tax expenditures related to higher education:
Exclusion from taxable income of value of outstanding loans
forgiven for community service; exclusion from taxable in-









on tuition and fees for the first two yearsof college. Thus, the maximum
Hope Credit is $1,500 a year. The Hope Credit is a modified descendent
of Georgia's "Hope Scholarship," which President Clinton first pro-
posed in his State of the Union address.
The Tax Credit for Lifelong Learning can be used for any year of
undergraduate or graduate education. It provides 20 percent of tuition
and fees up to $5,000 through 2002, and 20 percent of tuition and fees up
to $10,000 thereafter. The maximum tax credit is thus $1,000through
2002 and $2,000 after 2002. Both the Hope Credit and the Tax Credit for
Lifelong Learning are non-refundable and phase out for individuals
(non-joint-filers) earning $40,000 to $60,000 a year or couples (joint ifiers)
earning $80,000 to $100,000 a year. The Tax Credit for Lifelong Learning
is what is left of the President's proposal for a middle-class tax deduction
for college tuition of up to $10,000 a year.
Penalty-free withdrawals from Individual Retirement Accounts (WAs)
to pay for college expenses are a policy that has been proposed perenni-
ally since the Bush administration. The 1998 budget wifi be the first to
allow them. The standard 10-percent penalty will not apply to a with-
drawal from an IRA that pays for college expenses. In addition, the 1998
budget provides for new, tax-sheltered college savings accounts called
Education IRAs (EIRAs). EIRAs are similar to IRAs, except that the only
expense for which they can be used without attracting apenalty is col-
lege expense. A family may contribute up to $500 a year to an EIEA for
each dependent child under the age of nineteen. The right to make
penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs or contribute to tax-sheltered col-
lege savings accounts phases out for families (joint filers) earning
$150,000 to $160,000 a year.
The other major tax expenditure for higher education in the 1998 bud-
get is the tax deduction for interest paid on student loans. This is an
above-the-line deduction, so whether or not they itemize, borrowers
may deduct their interest up to $1,000 in1998. The maximum deduction
rises in $500 increments to $2,500 in 2001. The tax deduction phases out
for families (joint filers) earning $60,000 to $75,000 a year.
The 1998 budget also contains two minor tax expenditures for higher
education. The first restores for three years the exemption that lets work-
ers deduct from their taxable income up to$5,250 a year in undergraduate
tuition aid provided by their employers. This exemption is notavailable
for graduate work and is therefore not a large budget item. The second
excludes from a student's taxable income the value of outstanding insti-
tutional loans forgiven that year by a college in exchange for community
service. This provision affects only a tiny share of students.
Finally, the 1998 budget raises the maximum Pell grant from $2,700 aTax Incentives for Higher Education53
year to $3,000 a year. The Pell grant pays tuition, fees, and some living
expenses for poor students enrolled in college. The grant that each stu-
dent receives is a function of his family's income, assets, and composition;
the tuition, fees, and other expenses of his college; and the maximum Pell
grant.
As for coordination among the higher-education initiatives, only one
of the following four tax claims can be made for a student in a given year:
distribution from an IRA or EIRA, deduction of interest paid on student
loans, the Tax Credit for Lifelong Learning, and the Hope Credit. Any of
the four claims can be combined with the Pell grant, so long as the
relevant calculations of tuition paid subtract the amount paid by the Pell
grant.
3. THE HIGHER-EDUCATION ENVIRONMENT OF
THE 1990s
Before analyzing any of these initiatives, it is useful to survey the state of
higher education in the 1990s. Particularly since the late 1970s, the behav-
ior of both the demand side of higher education (the students) and the
supply side (the colleges) has changed in major ways.
3.1 Demand-Side Trends in Higher Education
On the demand side, the single most important phenomenon has been
the increased rate of return to education. A large empirical literature
now documents the high rate of return to college, relative to history,
over the entire period from 1978 to the present.2 The rate of return to
college education appears to have been particularly high during the
periods from 1978 to 1985 and from 1992 to the present. Relatively crude,
but nationally representative, calculations based on the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) suggest that each year of college education earned a
nominal rate of return of 5 percent from 1972 to 1978, of 13 percent from
1978 to 1985, of 9 percent from 1986 to 1991, and of 11 percent from 1992
to 1996. Estimates based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) incorporate the tuition and fee costs of college (unlike the CPS)
and control better for a student's family background and ability. These
2Katz and Murphy (1992); Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993); Murnane, Willett, and Levy
(1995).
Author's calculations based on wage differentials between 25-29-year-olds who have a
baccalaureate degree and who have a high-school degree or the equivalent. The re-
wording of the education question makes the very recent path of this wage differential
difficult to interpret.54 Hoxby
data are less representative but portray the same general trends: a 5-
percent rate of return for 1976 to 1978, a 9-percent rate of return from
1979 to 1984, and a 7-percent rate of return from 1985 to 1987.
Debate has arisen about whether the high rates of return actually
represent increased returns to college or increased returns to ability,
which is correlated with college.5 Perhaps the most convincing evidence
comes from students' enrollment behavior. When the rate of return to
college is high, students who are computing their optimal human-capital
investment should increase their desired years of education. In fact,
Figure 1 demonstrates that colleges' administrative records show a
steady upward trend in the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds who are
enrolled in college education over the period.6 If every demographic
group should have experienced the same growth in the percentageof
young people who enroll in college, then enrollment growth has been
slow for young people who are African-Americans, Hispanic, or from
households below the 25th percentile of the American income distribu-
tion.7 However, these groups began the period with substantially lower
enrollment rates, and the percentage growth in their enrollment is approxi-
mately the same as that of non-minority, non-poor households. Cam-
eron and Heckman (1997) present some well-estimated evidence on how
these rates of return influenced college enrollment.
Two-year colleges accounted for 28 percent of total enrollment in 1978,
but they have generated nearly half (44 percent) of the growth in college
enrollment since that time. About 96 percent of two-year college enroll-
ment takes place in public colleges. This, combined with the fact that the
overall public college share of enrollment has remained constant at 78
percent, suggests that public two-year enrollment has been substituted
for some public four-year college enrollment. Since the United States has
a low rate of college completion for students enrolled inpublic four-year
colleges, it is fair to summarize the environment as one in which stu-
dents who have a public college education are likely to attain less than a
baccalaureate degree while students who have a private college educa-
tion are more likely to attain the baccalaureate degree.
Some analysts have blamed real increases in college costs for the fact
that the four-year college completion rate has been falling since the late
Author's calculations based on the NLSY.
See Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) and Taber (1995).
6 Author's calculations based on the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) and Higher Education General Information System (HEGIS), compared with sam-
ple data on the population of 18- to 24-year-olds from the Current Population Survey.

























































































































































































































































































































































1960s. Rising financial hardship may explain a small share of students'
increasing tendency to drop out, but this explanation generally has a
poor fit with the data. The growth rate in the cost of the 44 percent of
colleges that account for 90 percent of the students who complete less
than four years has been less than one-quarter of the growth rate in the
cost of the 56 percent of colleges that account for the remaining 10
percent. To account for the difference in the probability of dropping out
between these two groups of colleges, the elasticity of dropping out with
respect to the price would have to be almost twelve times as large for
students in the first group of colleges as for students in the second
group. Note that 87 percent of the first group of students are enrolled in
public colleges, whereas only 24 percent of the second group of students
are enrolled in public colleges.8
A better explanation than financial hardship for the rising non-
completion rate is that people who are unlikely to attain baccalaureate
degreeseither because of their preferences or because of their
aptitudehave increasingly been drawn into college. Several factors
have been at work. One factor is students' increased use of college for
remediation and language acquisition (see Breneman, 1997). Approxi-
mately 14 percent of all college students and 35 percent of minority
students take at least one remedial class. If English as a second lan-
guage is also counted as remedial, then the percentage of minorities
who take at least one remedial class rises to 41 percent. Increasing
remediation at the college level is not an indictment of the efficacy of
college teaching. On the contrary, it is a symptom of America's trou-
bled secondary education sector and of increased immigration.
Another factor drawing low-probability-of-completion students into
college is the Fell grant. Use of the Pell grant has risen by 50 percent
since 1978 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1996). Students who
use the Pell grant at inexpensive (usually two-year) colleges need contrib-
ute very little to tuition. Under these circumstances, students have weak
financial incentives to enter with the preparation they need or make the
effort they need to make in order to derive maximal benefits from col-
lege. The fact that opportunity costs (forgone wages) are the main cost of
college education for many students who use the Pell grant only makes it
more likely that a student who realizes he is poorly prepared wifi decide
to make very little effort in college. Pell grant students have only weak
incentives to police their colleges and ensure that the colleges offer suffi-
cient education for the tuition being charged (to the federal govern-
8All statistics in this paragraph are author's calculations based on CASPAR, a panel data
set based on IPEDS and HEGIS.Tax Incentives for Higher Education57
ment). Since the early 1980s, the General Accounting Office has been
concerned about whether colleges admit students whom they do not
intend to seriously educate, in order to gain access to their Pell grants.
The use of the Pell grant in proprietary and private non-profit colleges
has fallen since the mid-1980s, perhaps in response to increased scrutiny
of these colleges. Public colleges, however, have always accounted for
the vast majority of Pell grant enrollments, so whether Pell grants are
used for low-return education at these public colleges is the weighty
question.
A final feature of higher education's demand side is the implicit tax on
asset accumulation due to need-based financial aid. The savings disincen-
tives generated by need-based aid were pointed out by Feldstein (1995)
and Edlin (1993), who demonstrated that colleges' granting less generous
financial aid to families who have more savings (all else equal) generates a
tax on saving. The best empirical evidence for this phenomenon is due to
Kim (1997) and Dick and Edlin (1997). Estimates suggest that the savings
disincentives almost exclusively affect families whose children attend pri-
vate colleges and whose incomes exceed $60,000. These families account
for a small percentage of college enrollment but a high percentage of those
whom we would ordinarily expect to save for college. Moreover, there is
reason to think that families are generally saving too little for higher
education. Students whose college admissions test scores and secondary-
school grades are similar should make similar human-capital investments
in college. Yet, National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey data indicate
that students with similar college aptitude make college choices that show
excess sensitivity to family savings. The elasticity of tuition at the college
chosen with respect to family savings is approximately 0.31, controlling
for measures of students' college aptitude. Even among students who
attend public colleges, this elasticity is 0.22.
3.2 Supply-Side Trends in Higher Education
The most salient phenomenon on the supply side of higher education
has been the real growth in college tuition. College tuition has risen
faster than the consumer price index (CPI) over the entire post-World
War II period. Figures 2 and 3 show the growth in college tuition and
tuition revenue from 1970 to 1993. Several explanations have been ad-
vanced for the rapid growth of tuition, especially that of private colleges.
Ebrenberg and Murphy (1993) point out that need-based aid mechanisti-
cally accelerates growth in "list price" tuition. If a college that uses need-
based aid wants to increase its tuition revenue at a certain rate, it must








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































raise its list tuition at a higher rate because every increase in list tuition
increases the financial aid it is committed to provide. The Ehrenberg
Murphy mechanism is a real phenomenon, but Figures 2 and 3 show
that not just list tuition but also tuition revenue has grown rapidly.
Clotfelter (1996) suggests that the increased rate of return to higher
education since 1978 has increased the demand for college and that
colleges have raised tuition in consequence. His argument implicitly
asserts that American colleges do not have elastic supply and do have
market power that allows them to take rents. This explanation does not
fit the data well. Four-year colleges' tuitions have grown much faster
than those of two-year colleges, yet longitudinal surveys suggest that
the total applicant pooi for baccalaureate education has grown by just
10 percent since 1978. In contrast, the pooi of applicants to two-year
colleges has grown by 36 percent, and these colleges' tuitions have
grown less than half as fast as those of four-year colleges. Moreover,
sluggish salary growth for college faculty (which has significantly
lagged behind that of other workers with post-baccalaureate education)
suggests that colleges have not reached the inelastic portion of their
supply curves.
The argument that colleges have market power conflicts with the evi-
dence of Hoxby (1997, 1998), who shows that colleges have faced an
increasingly integrated and competitive market over the post-World War
II era. The typical student no longer automatically chooses a local col-
lege. To obtain its student body, the median college now competes in a
market that spans almost 20 states as opposed to 5 states in 1950 (both
numbers are smaller if colleges are enrollment-weighted). This informa-
tion is summarized in Table 2. Hoxby suggests that the more integrated
structure of the college market and improved information flows (better
information for students about colleges and better information for col-
leges about students) have meant that colleges have experienced in-
creases in competition and have lost monopoly and monopsony power.
Colleges have responded to this loss of market power by differentiating
themselves vertically (by specializing in a certain quality of student and
level of admissions selectivity) and horizontally (by finding a market
nichefor instance, serving local managers who wish to pursue an
MBA in the evening). The differentiation response to market integration
is intuitive. Also, market integration and loss of market power induce a
decrease in colleges' ratio of tuition to the level of services they provide.
However, the microeconomics of the market for college education are
such that most of this decrease has occurred not through decreases in
tuition, but through increases in the package of services (hereafter called
"quality" for convenience, though it need not correspond to academicTABLE 2
The Increasing Geographic Integration of the Market for Baccalaureate
College Education
Tax Incentives for Higher Education61
Percentage of students who attended college in state
Percentage of baccalaureate-granting colleges that drew
students from.
Herfindahi indices for colleges,
showing concentration of their students'
states of residence
Note: Statistics calculated from a panel of 1,551 baccalaureate-granting colleges, taken from the Resi-
dence and Migration surveys. Colleges that do not grant baccalaureate degrees have negligible across-
state market integration, except in metropolitan areas that happen to span state lines.
quality) provided by colleges. Indeed, market integration has given col-
leges so much incentive to raise quality that it has led to increases in the
level of tuition (despite failing ratios of tuition to quality for many col-
leges), not merely increases in the dispersion of tuition.
In this paper, it is only possible to sketch the microeconomics of the
market for college education and why integration led to increases in the
level and dispersion of quality, rather than mere decreases in price. For
simplicity, consider local college autarkies, each of which has a mo-
nopoly producer of college education. Geographic integration of the
autarkies has pro-competitive effects because the former monopolists
compete with one another for consumers. This reduces tuition-to-quality
margins (price-cost margins) and benefits consumers (students). The
former monopolists also compete with one another for inputs. This
raises the wages of inputs, who include college workers but also college
students. These results carry over to the more general case in which each
local market begins with several college that may initially offer different
1949 1963 1968 1981 1994
All colleges 93.2 85.1 82.9 77.3 74.5
Private colleges 80.0 68.2 65.6 62.0 54.6
Public colleges 95.6 90.8 90.1 89.7 84.0
1949 1963 1968 1981 1994
All colleges 0.79 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.59
Private colleges 0.62 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.41
Public colleges 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.77
1949 1963 1968 1981 1994
40 or more states 2.4 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.3
20 or more states 16.2 25.2 26.1 26.7 35.562Hoxby
levels of service quality (vertical differentiation) or different packages of
services (horizontal differentiation).
Market integration tends to raise the level of service quality offered by
the average college, and the increase in service quality can be dramatic for
colleges that began with relatively good students and services. There are
several reasons why this occurs. First, as autarkies integrate, colleges
enjoy greater marginal returns to expenditure on quality improvements.
The intuition is that, for a given increase in service quality, a college can
attract many more students (consumers with higher demands). Second,
there are a few features of college education that give it especially interest-
ing microeconomics. The quality of a college is partly determined by the
peers with whom a prospective student would be educated. Students,
therefore, are inputs into the production of their particular college's educa-
tion as well as consumers of it. Students who have high demand for
quality education also tend to be high quality inputs. Rothschild and
White (1995) demonstrate that, because students are consumers and in-
puts simultaneously, net tuition (tuition minus any institutional grants)
combines the price that a student pays and the wage he is paid. In the
simplest case, colleges might charge a list tuition for students whose input
quality was minimal and offer scholarships (which rose with input qual-
ity) to all other students. More generally, colleges offer subsidies to stu-
dents in many forms. Market integration increases the quality demands of
high-demand, high-quality students because the "wages" that they can
spend on college education rise with the loss on monopsony power. This
implies that the quality of a college will rise more if it was initially a high-
quality college. Moreover, colleges that need to reduce their tuition-to-
quality margins when they face increased competition wifi generally do so
by raising quality. The reason is that a college that makes an investment in
quality wifi not just get the direct improvement in service quality, but will
also get an indirect improvement in quality as better student peers are
attracted. Conversely, a college that lowers its tuition-to-quality margin
by lowering its tuition and holding service quality constant will attract
new students, but the students will tend to have lower demand and
therefore be lower-quality peers. The indirect effect will work against the
college in this case.
In summary, theory predicts several reactions to increased integration
and competition in the market for college education:1°
10Market integration has also reduced the ability of states to offer highly subsidized public
college tuitions. Students are increasingly able to arbitrage differences in different states'
subsidies; middle-class parents are less enthusiastic about taxes to finance low "in-state"
tuition as their children become more likely to attend college out of state; and publicTax Incentives for Higher Education63
a loss of monopoly power for colleges, generating increased value for
students as consumers;
a loss of monopsony power for colleges, generating higher subsidies
for students whose quality (ability) is high;
an increase in average college quality because investments in quality
earn higher returns;
an increase in average college tuition commensurate with the average
quality increase;
increased sorting of students among colleges based on their demand
for quality;
a larger increase in quality (and tuition) for colleges that were initially
of high quality, owing to the fact that high-demand students have
their demand boosted by the income effect of the loss of monopsony
power;
unusual sustainability of quality competition compared to price com-
petition, owing to the fact that the indirect peer effect favors quality
competition;
increasing diversity among colleges along the lines of student ability,
quality, tuition, and subsidieswhereby the same colleges that have
the greatest increase in student ability have the greatest increase in
quality, tuition, and subsidies.
The increase in competitiveness (or decrease in local market power)
has not been eveniy spread across colleges. In particular, two-year col-
leges continue to draw students from populations whose mobility is
very limited because college is often combined with work or other re-
sponsibilities. In conditional logit equations that predict college choice,
proximity has had a waning influence for baccalaureate students since
1970 at least, and immediate proximity (a 5-mile radius of the family
home) has no statistically significant effect. For two-year students, the
immediate proximity of a college is statistically significant, and the point
estimates suggest that it is as important in a 1990 prediction of the
college chosen as it was in 1970.11
The final supply-side explanation for the increase in tuition is the
Bennett hypothesis, which argues that federal tuition subsidies (in the
form of Pell grants, reduced interest on student loans, and workstudy
wages) have fueled tuition increases. For two reasons, the least selective
part of the college market is where we are most likely to find empirically
colleges struggling to retain their past share of high-ability students can only do so by
breaking the same-tuition-subsidy-for-all rule.
11See Hoxby (1997).64 Hoxby
relevant increases in tuition driven by federal subsidies. First, as de-
scribed above, less selective colleges are more likely to still enjoy local
market power. Second, Fell grants and supplemental educational oppor-
tunity grants (SEOGs) account for 2.4 times as much federal expenditure
as the Perkins loan and workstudy programs combined. Fell grants
and SEOGs are paid disproportionately to two-year colleges, which,
though they enroll only 22 percent of American college students (mea-
sured in full-time equivalents), absorb 49 percent of the federal govern-
ment's expenditures on the Fell and SEOG programs. Also, Pell and
SEOG grants can fund a much larger share of a typical two-year college's
tuition. The average Fell grant at a public, two-year college was about
$1,400 in 1995, an amount which covers, on average, about two-thirds of
two-year college tuition (or about 80 percent of two-year public college
tuition). The average Fell grant at a private, four-year college was about
$1,600 in 1995, an amount which covers about one-fifth of tuition for the
average such college.
We lack definitive evidence on the elasticity of tuition with respect to
the Fell grant, but the best empirical methodology (from Li, 1997) is as
follows. We want to estimate individual college's tuition reactions (if
any) to exogenous changes in their opportunities to acquire Pell grant
revenue. Because colleges differ tremendously in the packages and qual-
ity of the services they offer, it is important to use panel data that allow
us to control for college-specific determinants of tuition. Because major
changes in the Fell-grant formula (from which we must ultimately derive
identification) do not occur every year, the minimum panel length is 12-
15 years ending with the current year. However, time series variation in
the Fell-grant formula is an inadequate source of identification, particu-
larly in an era in which higher education is simultaneously experiencing
other sources of pressure on tuition. Owing to the fact that they serve
different populations, different colleges experience very different reve-
nue shocks when the Pell formula changes. For instance, a public two-
year college serving a low-income area might have 20 percent of its
students using Pell grants. A two-year college in a middle-class, subur-
ban area might have only 5 percent of its students using them. A private,
selective, four-year college might have a negligible percentage of its
students on the Fell grant. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that a Fell-
grant recipient might be the marginal demander whose behavior sets
tuition in the public two-year college located in the low-income area
(assuming that the college has few institutional resources for giving
tuition discounts). However, no economic model would suggest that a
private, selective four-year college with the ability to use institutional
resources to offer students a variety of "net tuitions" would have a PellTax Incentives for Higher Education65
grant recipient as the marginal demander whose behavior sets the tu-
ition. We could think of directly using the cross-sectional variation
among colleges in the Pell-grant revenue attached tothe marginal,
tuition-setting student to identify the effect of federal grants on colleges'
tuitions.
However, a number of estimation problems arise. The first is that we
must estimate the probability that a college's tuition-setting student is a
Pell-grant recipient. This is not only a function of the entire distribution
of students in the college in a base year (knowing the characteristics of
the average student is not sufficient), it is also a function of the college's
control (public or private, since this affects the college's range of possible
tuition-setting policies) and the college's resources (since they affect the
college's ability to use institutional aid to price discriminate among stu-
dents). Given this estimate, we must then predict the shock from the
change in the Pell grant to the budget constraint of the students who are
predicted to be tuition-setting (assuming that the college does not
change its tuition). This prediction is created by feeding the characteris-
tics of a college's marginal students through the old and new Pell grant
formulae. Finally, we must use this predicted shock as an instrumental
variable for the actual shock to the budget constraint of the students who
are predicted to be tuition-setting. The intuitionbehind this empirical
procedure is that the predicted shock should not include any observed
changes in a college's population of students or the Pell grant of tuition
setting students that are themselves a response to the college's changing
tuition in the fact of an increased Pell grant.
Li (1997) carries out this empirical methodology using the universe of
Pell-grant recipients' records and a large sample of all federal financial
aid applicants. Her preliminary estimates, which should be interpreted
cautiously, suggest that a $100 increase in the per-student Pell grant reve-
nue of a public two-year college generates a $17 increasein tuition.
Significant increases are not found for public four-year colleges or private
four-year colleges, and the estimates for private two-year and propri-
etary two-year colleges are imprecise (because the number of these types
of college is small, the preliminary estimates are unreliable). It is impor-
tant to note that the predicted tuition increase for two-year colleges does
not occur because every college raises its tuition. The $17 represents the
average reaction of colleges, some of which do havePell grant recipients
as tuition-setters and some of which do not. Eventually, itwifi be possi-
ble to estimate the reaction of a college that has a large minority of
students on the Pell grant. Because it is easier for a college to choose the
best tuition response when a high proportion of its students use the Pell
grant, the tuition response wifi presumably be larger than $17.66Hoxby
A college's determination of the best tuition response is also compli-
cated by the fact that the Pell grant is a highly nonlinear function of a
student's background characteristics (family income, family wealth, fam-
ily composition), so that even an extraordinary college that had every
student on a Fell grant could not easily calculate the rise in list tuition
that would absorb the Fell grant increase. Moreover, a college's best
tuition response depends on the amount of competition it faces. In par-
ticular, a two-year college that retains significant local market power will
be able to absorb more of the Fell grant increase without experiencing
much reduction in enrollment.
4. INCREASED PELL GRANTS IN THE 1998 BUDGET
Given the above, the increase of the maximum Pell grant from $2,700 to
$3,000 in the 1998 budget requires only a few sentences of additional
analysis. The economic justification for Pell grants is clear. They give a
means-based subsidy to a group of students who are so poor that they
would otherwise likely be prevented by liquidity constraints from mak-
ing their optimal investments in college education. The 1998 budget
raises the Fell grant by more than 10 percent, and this would appear to
be a large increase. Figure 4 shows, however, that the $3,000 maximum
wifi not make the real Pell grant high relative to history. Moreover, since
college costs have been increasing faster than inflation, the Pell grant as
a percentage of average college costs has been falling almost monotoni-
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middle-class households are the main beneficiaries of the four tax provi-
sions in the 1998 budget, an additional benefit of raising the Fell grant is
that the increase wifi help to maintain the current degree of equality of
educational opportunity between poor and middle-class households.
The $3,000 Fell grant may also help poor students cope with the tuition
increases that are likely to occur in the wake of the two tax credits.
There are no major disadvantages to raising the Fell grant. Some
grants may be wasted by students who do not take college seriously or-
may be rent for colleges that exploit naive students, but there is little
reason to believe that the size of the increase wifi be sufficient to induce a
significant increase in waste.
5. PENALTY-FREE WITHDRAWALS FROM IRAs FOR
COLLEGE EXPENSES AND TAX-SHELTERED COLLEGE
SAVING ACCOUNTS
The federal budgets from 1998 to 2002 are expected to contain $1.0 billion
for the new policy allowing penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs for
college expenses and the creation of IRA-like college savings accounts
(EIRAs). This estimate appears to be a long-run, equilibrium estimate (as
though the policy existed in steady state) rather than an accurate predic-
tion for the first few years of a new savings plan (into which people can
easily transfer existing savings.) In the first few years of the policy, we
should expect families' dynamic readjustment to produce a surge of
withdrawals from IRAs and deposits to EIRAs.12
We expect the policy to work as follows. Each year, families with in-
come lower than the phaseout range were or are able to make tax-
sheltered savings deposits for college expenses of up to $2,000 per spouse
in IRAs plus $500 per child in EIRAs. IRAs from the era before the Tax
Reform Act of 1997 are front-loaded, meaning that contributions are not
included in gross income for tax purposes but are taxed when withdrawn.
12The 1998 budget estimate of $1 billion does not allow for dynamics. In 1998, families
with a child in college will withdraw more money from IRAs than they would if the policy
had always existed. Consider a family that would have liked to withdraw $1,000 a year
from an IRA for their child's college expenses had it been possible to do so without
penalty. If the child will be a college senior in 1998, the family might withdraw $4,000 in a
single year. On the other hand, people who already save for future college expenses will
immediately transfer the first $500 per child of their accumulated savings into tax-sheltered
CSAs. But many more families will have a stock of savings equal to $500 per child in 1998
than will have a yearlyflow of new savings of $500 per child, even with the new incentives
to save. The bulge of IRA withdrawals in 1998 will add tax revenue, but the bulge of
transfers to CSAs will remove tax revenue. One can form a reasonably good prediction of
the latter effect, but predicting the former effect with any accuracy is nearly impossible.Tax Incentives for Higher Education69
EIRAs and current IRAs are back-loaded, meaning that contributions are
taxed in the year of contribution but not thereafter. The income in all IRA!
EIRAs compounds tax-free, and no penalty is due on distributions from
IRA/EIR.As that are used to pay for college expenses. Table 3 and its notes
demonstrate that IRA/EIRAs are an advantageous means of saving for
college expenses, compared to regular savings accounts. One of the exam-
ples in Table 3 shows that the maximum that can possibly be accumulated
for a child's college expenses in IRA/EIRAs is about $109,000 in 1997
dollars. This accumulation assumes two parents who have only one child,
who make the maximum contribution for each member of the family each
year that the child is under age 19, and who earn a 3-percent real rate of
return on their savings. Another example in Table 3 shows that an annual
EIRA contribution as small as $200 wifi provide a student with about
$4,800 in 1997 dollars. Such a sum would be very useful: it would pay for
one year's tuition at a typical public college and for an Associates Degree
at most two-year colleges. A good rule of thumb is that the money needed
to achieve any given accumulation with a regular savings account is about
1.1 times the money needed with IRA/EIRAs. In short, the availability of
IRA/EIRAs substantially increases the average return to college saving. A
family's marginal rate of return to college saving wifi increase if the amount
($2,000 X no. of spouses) + ($500 X no. of children) is larger than what its
annual flow of new college saving would be in the absence of IRA/ETRAs.
There are several potential benefits from the IRA/EIRA program. The
first is an increase in savings among families who experience an increase
in the marginal rate of return to saving.13 Many economists'4 have argued
that America's savings rate is unduly depressed by capital taxation and
the social security program and that the low savings rate depresses eco-
nomic growth. The second benefit of the IRA/EIRA program is that it wifi
partially offset the tax on savings due to need-based aid. A third benefit
occurs because a number of states already have tax-sheltered savings
accounts that families can use for the expenses of certain in-state colleges.
The restriction that a student must attend college in state is becoming
more confining every year because inter-state mobility of college students
has been increasing steadily since 1940, as shown in Table 2. Inter-state
mobility is especially important for students whose achievement is high
enough to earn admission to selective collegesexactly those students
13 A family must not only experience an increase in its marginal return to college saving, it
must also be on the margin of saving for college. A family whose entire saving is dedicated
to retirement expenses, for instance, will not experience an increase in its marginal return
to savings.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for whom forward-looking college saving is most important. Thus, state
tax-sheltered accounts unintentionally constrain students to make less-
than-optimal college choices and disfavor college savings for high-ability
students. IRA/EIIRAs will eliminate these between-student distortions be-
cause they are attractive enough to supersede most state programs.15
The most important potential benefit of IRA/EIRAs comes from the fact
that they offset some of the capital market failures for human capital
investments. Because human capital investments are not collateralizable
and because a person's investment in human capital is undiversifiable (he
can only invest in his own human capital), there are numerous failures in
the financing of an investment in college education. For this reason, many
students rely on parental savings. But there are reasons why parents may
not perceive a high enough return to saving for their children's college
expenses. Parents do not receive direct benefits of their children's college
education, and they do not have a method of ensuring indirect benefits
through repayment with interest. Their children may give too little back to
them, or their children may give similar amounts rather than the amounts
that would equalize the marginal return to parents' saving. Even if the
parents could obtain repayment under most circumstances, they might
choose not to have so many assets tied up in undiversified investments.
For all these reasons, investment in college education is likely to be lower
than optimal. By subsidizing the return to college savings, JF.A/EIRAs
would be a countervailing force that would move human capital invest-
ment closer to the optimum.
Another important benefit of the IRA/EIRAs is that, by encouraging
families to put savings into accounts dedicated to college expenses, they
wifi make families think about college education earlier and with greater
commitment. It appears that there is an educational advantage to early
commitment. Students make more optimal college decisions and more
effort in secondary school when they are interested early on in preparing
to attend college. As Owen (1995) notes, much of students' failure to
prepare well for college while in secondary school comes from the remote-
ness of the college choice decision. By establishing a college savings
account, a student is forced to think more concretely about the return to
college education. Thaler's (1990) work on mental accounts provides a
If a student knows exactly which college he wishes to attend long in advance and the
tuition that his parents will pay is systemically rising faster than inflation, they may also
benefit from plans that allow them to pre-pay tuition. The plans generally restrict future
college choice severely. In addition, some parents use the plans as insurance against a risk
they do not face. Parents pay too much attention to how fast the list price of tuition is
rising, and not enough attention to how fast the tuition net of financial aid that they would
pay is rising.Tax Incentives for Higher Education73
theoretical basis for the observation that students become significantly
more interested in future college attendance if they stand to suffer a
penalty from transferring savings from college expenses to other uses.
Unfortunately, IRA/EIRAs provide little help to students who have
parents who are prevented from saving by liquidity constraints or who
lack foresight. Also, the current IRA/EIRA phase out region is rather low if
we want the tax shelter to offset the "tax" on college savings generated by
need-based aid. Of the families most likely to distort their consumption
and asset choices to avoid the "tax" (families of students who attend
selective private colleges that offer substantial amounts of institutional,
need-based aid), 21 percent have household incomes greater than
$150,000. In general, institutional need-based aid calculations will spread
some of the benefits of IRA/EIRA saving to families that choose not to
save.
6. THE DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ON
STUDENT LOANS
IRA/EIRAs only generate more optimal human capital investments for
students whose parents are able or willing to save for college expenses.
For students who do not receive a sufficient boost to their incentives
through this channel, the 1998 through 2002 budgets contain approxi-
mately $1 billion for the deducting the interest paid on student loans. In
1998, an individual can deduct from his taxable income up to $1,000 of
interest he paid during the year. By 2001, the maximum deduction wifi
have risen to $2,500. An individual need not itemize to take the deduc-
tion. If the deduction is taken, then the effective interest rate is i(1 -T)
where i is the statutory rate andTis the income tax rate that applies to
the borrower.
The major economic benefit of the tax deduction is that it can make
human-capital investments more optimal by subsidizing the cost of bor-
rowing to finance such investments. Market failures for investments in
human capital tend to make students require a rate of return to invest-
ments in human capital that is excessive relative to that which is socially
optimal. The main causes of failure in the market for student loans is
that a student's investment in his human capital is non-collateralizable
and non-diversifiable. Being risk-averse, students require a rate of return
on the investment that is higher than the average rate of return to other
economic investments. The deductibility of interest on student loans
reduces students' required rate of return and thus is likely to move
human capital investment towards the social optimum.74 Hoxby
A minor benefit of the deduction for interest on student loans may be
an increase in repayment compliance. Compliance is a serious problem
for federally guaranteed student loans (the default rate is 9.9 percent on
average).16 In any year, there are individuals on the margin of complying
because their costs of compliance (payments) are not much smaller than
their costs of non-compliance (the expected value of penalties). The de-
ductibility of interest might induce a few people to comply who would
otherwise be out of compliance. This would decrease the federal govern-
ment's cost of guaranteeing student loans.
Unfortunately, the deductibility of interest on student loans discour-
ages college savings because it lowers the price of financing through
loans relative to financing through saving. For the same reason that the
policy "insures" students against the accident of having parents who are
unable or unwilling to save, the policy discourages saving.
The 1998 budget unduly constrains the use of the deduction. The
policy starts out with maximum deduction ($1,000) that is so small that
the marginal rate of interest for approximately 20 percent of students wifi
not change. Additional constraints are imposed by the fact that the
maximum deduction is per household, not per student. The constraints
on the use of this policy are unfortunate because lowering the cost of
borrowing for a college education is one of the simplest ways of remedy-
ing capital-market failures for investments in human capital.
7. GENERAL NOTES ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
POLICIES THAT SUBSIDIZE A FAMILY'S USE OF THE
CAPITAL MARKET FOR COLLEGE EXPENSES AND
POLICIES THAT SUBSIDIZE THE PRICE OF COLLEGE
The previous two policies work by lowering the "hurdle" rate of return
that an investment in college education must earn. They can be justified
by appealing to obvious failures in the capital market for human-capital
investment. The policies intervene in the capital marketby raising the
return to savings for college investments and lowering the cost of bor-
rowing for college investments. The subsidy received is a function of a
student's use of the capital market. Note that nowhere along the way
have I had to invoke the argument that investments in college are a
public good. That argument is troublesome because even if we believe a
priori that some public returns exist, we have no way of quantifying
16See U.S. General Accounting Office (1997) and Miles and Zimmerman (1997) for recent
evidence on the student loan program.Tax Incentives for Higher Education75
them adequately to calculate appropriate subsidies. In addition, it is
unsatisfactory because both the formation of firms and the formation of
neighborhoods contain mechanisms that internalize many of the exter-
nalities associated with being around college-educated people.
The Tax Credit for Lifelong Learning and Hope Credit do not have the
two desirable properties mentioned above. First, if they are to be justi-
fied as education policies (likely to induce more optimal investments in
education) and not just as tax cuts, then we must invoke the argument
that investments in college are a public good. Second, the fact that the
tax subsidies are simple functions of the tuition that a student pays
almost invites real tuition increases. While these tuition increases are
likely to be balanced by quality increases among colleges that face a large
amount of competition from other colleges, colleges that do not face
much competition because their students are constrained by location
may simply raise price.
8. THE TAX CREDIT FOR LIFELONG LEARNING
The Tax Credit for Lfelong Learning (TCLL) is by far the most expensive
policy I have considered thus far. For each undergraduate or graduate
student, the TCLL can give a tax credit equal to 20 percent of the amount
(up to $5,000) he spends on tuition and fees. The maximum amount rises
to $10,000 after 2002. Note that (at least until 2003) students should
always elect to use the Hope Credit over the TCLL if they are eligible for
both, since the Hope Credit wifi always be more generous.
The TCLL is a good education policy if the difference between the
social and private returns to college is large enough to justify the size of
the subsidy. If a public return exists, then we can induce more optimal
investments in human capital either by subsidizing use of the capital
market for college (IRA/EIRAs or tax deductions for interest on student
loans) or by subsidizing the price of college (as in the TCLL). That is,
arguments based on social returns exceeding private returns do not im-
ply that price subsidies are better than capital market subsidies, but
arguments based on capital-market failures do imply that capital market
subsidies are better than price subsidies. Therefore, if we are to justify
price subsidies, we must invoke a social return argument. In the case of
the TCLL, if the first $5,000 of college expenditure each year ($10,000
after 2002) earns a social return that exceeds its private return by an
amount approximately equal to the market rate of return, then the policy
wifi induce students to make human capital investments that are socially
optimal.
We might also analyze the TCLL purely as a tax cut for middle-class76 Hoxby
taxpayers. The tax cut is distributed according to the amount of tuition a
family pays for college, not according to its income or the amount of tax
it pays. This creates divergent tax rates between households that, for
instance, are the same except that their children attend colleges with
different tuitions.17 Such divergence can be justified with the argument
that higher education earns public returns, but then we are back to
needing to justify the TCLL as an education policy, not as a middle class
tax cut. Moreover, the TCLL is not a general middle class tax cut, be-
cause it is highly age-specific and thus applies to only about 8 percentof
Americans each year. Thus, the creation and possible future destruction
of the TCLL can produce significant inter-cohort inequalities in taxation.
A more disturbing problem for the TCLL as a tax cut is that some of tax
credit may end up in hands other than those of the intended recipients,
middle-class taxpayers. If the TCLL generates increases in college tu-
ition, then the families who receive the credit wifi get smaller increases
in income than the TCLL appears to grant them. Our best evidence on
the elasticity of tuition with respect to tuition subsidies comes from the
last ten years' changes in the Pell grant (Turner, 1997; Li, 1997). How-
ever, we do not have direct evidence on the tuition consequencesof
tuition subsidies that are as large and ubiquitous as the TCLL. Li's esti-
mate of $17 of increased tuition per $100 of increased Pell grant should
be adjusted upwards before being applied to the TCLL because it is
significantly harder for a college to calculate the non-competitive tuition
response for a Pell-grant increase than for the TCLL. The TCLL wifi be
much more ubiquitous than the Pell grant, which involves only a small
minority of students at most colleges. Fewer than 2 percent of American
colleges have more than 40 percent of their students on the Pell grant. In
contrast, nearly every college in the United States that has undergradu-
ate juniors, seniors, or graduate students wifi have the TCLL apply to
more than 90 percent of these students on average.
The second reason is that the TCLL is a simple function of the tuition
that a student pays, whereas the Pell grant is a highly nonlinear function.
While the non-competitive tuition response to the Pell grant would in-
volve complex calculations and price discrimination, the non-competitive
tuition response to the TCLL would be an across-the-board tuition in-
The second sort of horizontal inequity is particularly troubling if it arises because the
households are in states that have different policies about public-college tuition. If a house-
hold has paid additional taxes over a long period of time so that its public colleges (which
cost the same amount as other states' colleges to run, say) can charge minimal tuition, it is
not reasonable to penalize the household by giving it a smaller tax credit. Also note that the
fact that the credit is non-refundable may create horizontal inequities among families who
are identical except their children are differently spaced. A family with multiple children in
college simultaneously is more likely to be constrained by non-refundability.Tax Incentives for Higher Education77
crease approximately equal to 20 percent of tuition up to $5,000 ($10,000
after 2002). Colleges that face immobile student bodies should be able to
raise their tuitions by a high proportion of the TCLLmore than $17 for
every $100 of subsidy. Fortunately, colleges that have substantial local
market power tend to have small programs or no programs for upper-
division undergraduates and graduate students. Among colleges that
face the integrated market, a college that absorbed much of the TCLL
without commensurate quality increases would lose students to its compe-
tition. Thus, we should expect selective colleges to raise tuition by a
fraction of the TCLL ($17 per $100 is a reasonable first approximation) and
to raise quality commensurately.
Because the TCLL only gives a credit equal to 20 percent of tuition and
fees that a family pays, families are still responsible for the majority of
tuition. Therefore, the TCLL is not likely to induce students to enroll in
college for reasons that are more recreational than educational. Also,
students wifi still have plenty of incentive to make effort so that they
may earn a private earnings return on college education that is approxi-
mately a market rate of return.
9. THE HOPE CREDIT
The Hope Credit applies to the first two years of college. It offers stu-
dents a tax credit equal to 100 percent of the first $1,000 they spend on
tuition and fees in a year, and 50 percent of the second $1,000. The Hope
Credit is expected to cost the federal government even more than the
TCLL, so it is the most expensive of the higher-education provisions.
Several of the Hope Credit's potential benefits and costs are similar to
those of the TCLL. It can be justified as an education policy and a
sensible distribution of a tax cut if the first $1,000 plus 50 percent of the
next $1,000 earns a social return that exceeds the private return by an
amount equal to the market return on capital. It may be easier to con-
vince people of this argument than to convince people of the parallel one
for the TCLL. This is because there is a widespread belief that ratio of
social to private benefits is higher for lower levels of education.
Clinton's initial vision of the Hope Credit suggested that the 13th
and 14th years of school could be made "universal" because the credit
would make community college free or nearly free. The Hope Credit's
first problem arises precisely because of this vision. As discussed,
community-college education has grown faster than any other type of
college education since 1978, but is rarely used as a port of entry for
ultimate completion of a baccalaureate degree. Community colleges are
successful and cheap providers of remedial secondary-school educa-78Hoxby
tion, and a year of community college education earns a rate of return
roughly equal to the rate of return earned on a year of baccalaureate
education (Kane and Rouse, 1995).
Unfortunately, the fact that community colleges provide a worthwhile
service does not imply that it is good policy to make them nearly free and
nearly universal. It is precisely because community college is not free
and not universal that it succeeds with students who often have little to
show for their secondary schooling. Many students who graduate from
secondary school evidently do not take it seriously; longitudinal data on
achievement tests indicate that the students' rate of learning slows sub-
stantially after the 8th grade, and 17 percent of students do not evince
any statistically significant learning after the 8th grade. Such students
have, on average, over $6,500 a year spent on their secondary-school
education, yetbecause the money is not theirsit is unusual to find a
student who is troubled by having wasted a good part of $26,000 over
the course of secondary school. When the same students enroll in com-
munity college, they are much more motivated. The amount of money
($1,650 is average tuition) they are investing is small relative to more
than $6,500 for an average year of secondary school, but it is sufficiently
large relative to their incomes to make them zealous about earning a
return. Also, the near-universality of high school diplomas has made
them into uninformative signals to employers (Owen, 1995).18 A high-
school graduate who wants to signal that he is more job-ready, skilled,
and motivated than his peers can currently use college course taking as a
classic Spence (1974) method of signaling However, signals only work
in equilibrium if there are sufficient cost or learning hurdles to deter
those who lack skills, motivation, and job readiness. If the 13th and 14th
years of education become nearly free and universal, individuals may
find it necessary to engage in a 15th year of education in order to signal
the same degree of job readiness that they currently signal with only 13
years. In summary, if the Hope Credit were to succeed in making com-
munity college nearly universal, it would probably do so at the cost of
making community college students less motivated and making the com-
munity college degree less rewarded.
The second disadvantage of the Hope Credit is that its current struc-
ture invites abuse. So long as they maintain half-time enrollment, stu-
dents will be able to take up to $1,000 of college courses free. Half-time
status for $1,000 is possible in most community colleges, and students
18They do signal that an individual does not have the serious disorders that lead to
dropping out of high school. This is why the GED earns a return despite the fact that the
typical GED recipient learns very little in preparing for the test. See Murnane, Tyler, and
Wilett (1997) and Cameron and Heckman (1997).Tax Incentives for Higher Education79
wifi be able to enroll full time in most community colleges for just $200 to
$500 a year. The contributions that the students themselves must make
are so small that some of the students who enroll in response to the
Hope Credit will not be primarily seeking education, but the package of
recreation, job placement services, sports facilities, and access to in-
expensive health care that colleges provide. Moreover, the rule that
students must be in their first or second year of college will be unenforce-
able for a number of years. There is no registry of individuals' college
degrees in the United States, nor do data exist that would allow the
federal government to make such a registry. Colleges can require an
applicant's high school record, but they have no way of insuring that
"first- and second-year students" (those in their first or second year at
the particular college) have not already completed college. Indeed,
Lalonde, Jacobson, and Sullivan (1997) indicate that a substantial mi-
nority of community college course takers already hold baccalaureate
degrees. There is nothing wrong with college graduates returning to
community college or other introductory college programs if they are
doing it in order to improve their earnings, but it is not the intention of
the policy to provide college graduates with additional schooling or recre-
ational opportunities at taxpayer expense. The Internal Revenue Service
can do no more than guarantee that only two years of Hope Credit are
claimed for any one social security number.
The most serious problem with the Hope Credit is that it encourages
colleges to raise tuition. Many colleges in the United States wifi have
nearly every first- and second-year student receiving a tax credit of ex-
actly $1,500, so colleges should have no difficulty coordinating the
non-competitive tuition response. Tuition increases should be expected
especially from two-year colleges, because they often have local market
power and they only enroll first- and second-year students (allowing
them to raise tuition across the board, instead of via complex price dis-
crimination). We cannot get a precise prediction for the effect of the
Hope Credit on tuition, but among two-year colleges and other colleges
that enroll students from a very local population, all the information we
have suggests that $17 for every $100 would be a serious underestimate.
Perhaps $25 out of every $100 of the tax cut are likely to be absorbed by
tuition increases.
10. SUMMING UP
When we consider all of the programs together, two conclusions stand
out. First, a small share of federal resources are allocated to the higher-
education initiatives that have the best properties as education policies.80 Hoxby
Second, the higher-education tax credits are an inefficient means of dis-
tributing middle-class tax cuts, especially if a substantial share of the
Hope Credit is absorbed by tuition increases.
The rule that prevents households from using more than one of the four
tax provisions for higher education in the same year is poorly constructed.
It is reasonable to allow a student to take only the Hope Credit or the
TCLL. However, by preventing students from taking Hope Credits or
TCLLs in the same year that they take distributions from EIRAs, the
federal government is imposing another implicit tax on college savings.
Conflict may also arise between deducting interest paid on a student's
undergraduate loans and taking the TCLL for graduate education. There
is no economic rationale for preventing students from using these two
benefits simultaneously.
Finally, empirical education research suggests that the IRA/EIRA pro-
gram has long-term benefits that are hard to quantify but ultimately very
important. The most powerful variables in explaining the earnings re-
turn that a student gets from a year of education are usually variables
that indicate a family's concern and planfulness about education. If IRA!
EIRAs help families set up mental accounts for their children's college
education, then they may motivate students to make more of the learn-
ing opportunities they currently haveespecially since American educa-
tion is already the most expensive in the world.
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